Since the 2000 presidential election, and the revelation of flaws in the Florida process, the nation has moved toward new balloting techniques. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) put the electoral process on a course to fully embrace electronic balloting systems. But problems have plagued the introduction of these systems, in many places. The Fairfax County, VA, Republican Committee recently called for an independent review of touchscreen voting technology, in its report Operation Ballot Integrity. The report noted that in the first trial of new machines, some failed, and at least one actually subtracted one vote for every 100 cast for a particular candidate.

Today, an article in the New York Times reported that a "Red Team" security test conducted for Maryland's legislature revealed troubling security gaps in the voting system sold to the state by Diebold. The report indicated that the flaws could be addressed even in time for the March primary, but urged that they be addressed without delay. The test demonstrated a wide range of rudimentary tactics that could be used to taint or even steal an election.

The organization VerifiedVoting.org addresses the popular question of why the story is not more prominent in national media, and lists newspapers that have been covering the story. They also recommend that the curious execute a Google News search for "electronic voting" to find more stories on the subject.

New Jersey Congressional Representative Rush Holt introduced a bill last year, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 (HR-2239), to correct the legal and technical flaws surrounding electronic voting, as well as security loopholes in HAVA. Opponents have argued that fears about technical failure, error or manipulation are founded on speculation alone. But such failures have already occurred. According to Holt's website:

In the 2002 election, brand new computer voting systems used in Florida lost over 100,000 votes due to a software error. Errors and irregularities were also reported in New Jersey, Missouri, Georgia, Texas, and at least 10 other states.

The common occurrence of these flaws is troubling to many electoral experts and observers. The reason for switching to electronic ballots is the promise that they will resolve tabulation glitches common with older machines. Various studies and tests have suggested that in many cases, the touchscreens are not yet even as good as older machines, in terms of security, process integrity and verification, perhaps due to a rush to the marketplace. These concerns have slowed the effort to implement HAVA, but millions of voters will be faced with new touchscreens this November. The question is whether presently available information about possible glitches and vulnerabilities will be addressed in time to ensure the integrity of November's national election.

The issue is gaining traction among both conservative and liberal Americans, as voters begin to realize that their votes may be less likely to be counted, or properly counted, than ever. The systems can work, say analysts, but neither current law nor the majority of electronic systems as conceived and produced can guarantee an accurate tabulation of votes.

Primary among serious concerns with the integrity of new touchscreen systems is the absence of a voter-verified paper trail, a means by which a voter can know that the machine has actually done what is says it has. The paper ballots would also be saved and would serve as a traditional, physical means (meeting current and long-standing legal standards) of verifying a vote-count, if verification is needed.

Another major area of concern is the use of proprietary software, known only to the manufacturer of the voting machines. This is seen by experts as a short-cut to a false sense of security, based on the assumption that if no one knows the code, no one can tamper with the machines. In fact, proprietary software is often the target of hackers, and a proprietary system is more vulnerable to tampering from within. HR-2239 would require that all of the above concerns be resolved by the November elections, and that open-source software be the standard for electronic voting machines.

Despite the fact that resolution of these issues would produce an electoral climate favorable to all, for its fairness and integrity, there is continuing opposition by political figures who claim that there is no need to provide a means for voters to verify that their vote has been counted as intended. That opposition appears to be withering, as more members of Congress join in support of proposed legislation. Yet, only 6 Republicans have so far signed on to support HR-2239, despite calls from their own party constituency to do so.

Resources...

• VerifiedVoting.org
• Accupoll: machines with voter-verified paper trail
• Center for Voting & Democracy
• Perfect Voting System